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INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes a novel framework for thinking about the
structure of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The Model Law’s
framework is best understood as a modular design structure, that is, a
framework that manages complexity by breaking the system down into semiautonomous units. 1 Principles of modularity have proven useful in thinking
about various transactional structures, from contract boilerplate to complex
merger-and-acquisition agreements. 2 It can likewise provide insights into the
Model Law, explaining its structure and providing guidance as to its
implementation.
Modularity is a means of breaking down complex systems, and the
realm of cross-border insolvency is indeed a complex system involving
multiple interdependent legal systems. Without a single universal court
capable of administering the worldwide estate of a multinational debtor, it is
often necessary for the multinational debtor to be subject to multiple
bankruptcy procedures around the globe. Rulings in any one proceeding are
likely to have exogenous consequences. For example, a decision to liquidate
the debtor’s assets in jurisdiction A may impede the enterprise-wide
reorganization plans proceeding in jurisdiction B. In order to preserve the
going-concern value of the estate and to facilitate a restructuring, there must
be some means of coordinating the multiple proceedings. Coordination
involves creating a procedural structure that will govern courts and bind the
debtor, creditors, and other interested parties.
The United Nations’ Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—adopted
by the United States in chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code—creates a
procedure for coordinating the administration of these multiple territorial
cases and, in doing so, to centralize that administration. Nations that adopt
the Model Law commit themselves to coordinate with foreign bankruptcy
proceedings whenever a foreign bankruptcy trustee (or similarly appointed
official) opens a proceeding under the Model Law. Such a model law effort
has network effects, with greater value the more widely it is adopted. At this

1. Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
19, 19 (2002).
2. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175, 1196 (2006); Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in
Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1417 (2016) (discussed further infra Part
II.A).
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point, the Model Law’s network is quite large, as more than forty nations
have adopted it. 3
The implementation of the Model Law has produced some challenges,
though, as courts have at times reached inconsistent and unpredictable
results. In thinking about these challenges, Professor Jay Westbrook has
suggested courts should interpret the Model Law as “a system text” that
creates an international legal system for addressing the centralization
challenge. 4 As opposed to a “standards text” that aims to establish
international standards, a system text creates “an institutional and procedural
structure” to carry out its ends. 5
In thinking about the Model Law as creating a cross-border insolvency
system, we can see an entire research agenda in analyzing its institutional
and procedural structure. We can think about the role of judges, as Adrian
Walters does in this issue, as well as the other institutional actors within that
system (lawyers, trustees, creditors); and we can think about legal systems
more generally, as the international system interacts with both common and
civil law systems. 6
This Article considers the design structure of the Model Law’s crossborder system, arguing that the Model Law can be understood as reflecting
a modular design. While the Model Law may not be intentionally modular,
principles of modularity help to explain its structure, to frame its
implementation challenges, and to suggest solutions to those challenges.
The characteristic feature of modular systems is that they divide
systems into semi-autonomous units. 7 Units are autonomous to the extent
that they have standardized and simple interactions with the other system
units, that is, to the extent that information flow among the units is
restricted. 8 Consider, for ease of illustration, the two basic structures of
television shows. Shows may be thought of as systems that are broken down
into “units” of episodes. There are two basic ways episodes “interact” with
one another: there are procedural shows, such as Law & Order, and serial
3. Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html
[https://perma.cc/QXA6-87NL].
4. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 754 (2015).
5. Id. at 753.
6. See generally Adrian Walters, Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in
the Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084117 [https://perma.cc/9232-DY29]); Andrew
B. Dawson, The Problem of Local Methods in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 53
(2015).
7. Langlois, supra note 1.
8. Id.
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shows, such as Game of Thrones. Law & Order episodes are relatively
independent, stand-alone components of the overall series. There is little
information from episode 1 that would be necessary to episode 2. In fact, the
series can be watched out of sequence with very few challenges to plot or
character development. In contrast, information flow among episodes of
Game of Thrones is intense: significant plot and character development may
be lost if a viewer were to skip a single episode. If we consider each episode
as a unit of the larger system of the show, Law & Order highly restricts interepisode information flow. Game of Thrones does not. Law & Order is,
therefore, a more modular “system.”
While modularity’s information-hiding function has been a useful tool
for analyzing private ordering, this is the first article (to my knowledge) to
employ modularity explicitly to analyze a statutory schema. Scholars have
used modularity to help explain and theorize the role of boilerplate in
contracts; 9 the multi-step procedure in modern deal making; 10 and the role
of collaboration and innovation in contract design. 11 In addition, principles
of modularity underlie theories as to the role of asset partitioning, as well as
the role of cross-guarantees and cross-default provisions in asset-partitioned
arrangements. 12 Modularity may be useful not only to explain these private
ordering structures but also to provide insights into the cross-border
insolvency system.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the
Model Law, including its history, development, and emerging issues.
Readers already versed in this area may safely skip to Part II, which argues
that modularity helps to explain the structure of the Model Law’s crossborder insolvency system. This section provides insights and examples of
modularity in complex systems, including engineering and manufacturing,
and then applies those principles to the architecture of the Model Law. The
Model Law’s modular features are reflected in two main sets of rules
governing inter-court cooperation—one for cooperation that is triggered
automatically once certain criteria are met (Automatic Assistance) and one
for cooperation that may be granted if certain standards are met

9. Smith, supra note 2, at 119.
10. Hwang, supra note 2, at 1417–18.
11. Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 83, 140 (2008).
12. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE
L.J. 387, 399 (2000); see, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions
and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015).
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(Discretionary Assistance). 13 Each of these protocols reflects different
degrees of modularity. The more information is restricted, the more modular
the set of rules. When we look at these rules from this perspective of
modularity, we can better understand how U.S. courts have applied these
rules when interpreting cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and
how courts should interpret the Model Law as the case law develops in this
field.
Having framed the Model Law as reflecting a modular design structure,
Part III then characterizes the Model Law’s implementation problems as
problems of imperfect modularity. In other words, the Model Law’s
challenges in many ways reflect a breakdown of its attempts to restrict
information flow: While the Model Law intends to limit the number and
intensity of interactions among courts, the implementation of the Model Law
at times creates new connections and at other times invites highly intense
interactions.
Part IV then considers the implications of these insights to the question
of Discretionary Assistance and choice of law. The Model Law does not tell
courts how to determine choice-of-law questions; however, the way this
protocol hides information from the ancillary proceeding is a strong indicator
about where these questions should be answered. By restricting the
information flow to ancillary proceedings, the Model Law effectively leaves
the choice-of-law decision to be made in the foreign main proceeding. By
focusing on the information-hiding functions of the Model Law, we can see
that the Model Law does not definitively settle the thorny choice-of-law
questions as to Discretionary Assistance, but it does suggest where these
questions should be addressed.

13. The Model Law also provides for “Additional Relief.” See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE
LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION,
at
5,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.14.V.2
(2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactmente.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BTS-E3FW] [hereinafter MODEL LAW]. This provision is best understood as
clarifying that enactment of the Model Law does not limit the adopting country’s existing (or future)
avenues for relief in cross-border insolvency proceedings. See Ad Hoc Grp. of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro
S.A.B. de C.V. (In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V.), 701 F.3d 1031, 1054 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We conclude that a
court confronted by this situation should first consider the specific relief enumerated under § 1521(a) and
(b). If the relief is not explicitly provided for there, a court should then consider whether the requested
relief falls more generally under § 1521’s grant of any appropriate relief.”). But see David L. Eaton &
Aaron J. David, Reconciling “Additional Assistance” with “Appropriate Relief” in Ch. 15, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Feb. 2017, at 20. This may have important implications in some cases, but this is outside the
scope of the two main protocols for inter-court assistance.
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I. THE CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY SYSTEM
Before considering the design structure of the Model Law, it may be
helpful to consider first the problem the Model Law is designed to solve,
namely, the lack of a single forum capable of centralizing the administration
of the debtor’s cross-border estate. Because administrative centralization is
often essential to preserving the value of the estate and to permit financial
reorganization, some degree of cross-border coordination is therefore
necessary. This cooperation is an inherently complex system, as it requires
multiple actors (debtors, creditors, tribunals, and trustees, for example)
working across different substantive debtor-creditor laws. Section A below
discusses the two main types of systems to address the lack of administrative
centralization. Section B will then discuss the Model Law’s approach more
specifically.
A. Administrative Centralization in Cross-Border Insolvency
If a debtor has assets and creditors in more than one nation, there will
be no single jurisdiction that can administer the entire bankruptcy estate or
bind all creditors. 14 Each nation has control over only those assets within its
jurisdiction, thus requiring some sort of international cooperation to sell all
of a debtor’s assets or to reorganize the entire enterprise. State sovereignty,
thus, poses a serious obstacle to any effort to preserve the going-concern
value of a multinational enterprise. As Jay Westbrook describes it,
preserving going-concern value requires market symmetry: the governing
bankruptcy law must be symmetric in reach as the debtor’s legal relations
with its creditors. 15
The challenge is a familiar one to those who have thought about the
relationship of the U.S. federal and state governments in the realm of U.S.
bankruptcy law. During the nineteenth century, there was no permanent
bankruptcy law, with only short-lived bankruptcy laws enacted in the

14. See John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45
VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 944 (2006) (“In a critical respect, the ‘problem’ of transnational insolvencies, at least
at one level, might be nothing more than an admittedly challenging choice-of-law issue: whose (policyrich) laws of distribution, priority, and avoidance should govern the insolvency of the multi-jurisdiction
debtor?”).
15. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,
2283 (2000) (describing this ability of bankruptcy law to bind all stakeholders as “‘market symmetry’:
the requirement that some systems in a legal regime must be symmetrical with the market, covering all
or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that market with respect to the legal rights and duties
embraced by those systems”).
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immediate wake of financial crises. 16 Without a federal bankruptcy law in
place, there would be no single state court proceeding that could govern the
assets and creditors of an interstate business. 17 Such a debtor would be forced
to open proceedings in multiple states, asking courts to honor the orders from
its “home” jurisdiction. Opening multiple proceedings is expensive. Worse,
it creates coordination problems. If the debtor is liquidating, intra-court
cooperation may be necessary in order to conduct a going-concern sale of
the debtor’s assets. If the debtor is reorganizing, this would require
coordinating proceedings to ensure that the debtor’s reorganization plan
would be enforceable against all creditors. Federal bankruptcy law solves
these coordination problems by centralizing the administration of the estate
into a single proceeding, thus providing market symmetry between the legal
regime and the debtor’s multi-jurisdiction estate.
Whereas federal bankruptcy law can solve this challenge within the
U.S. federal system, there is no such international bankruptcy law to provide
market symmetry for a multinational debtor. Instead, each country has
jurisdiction over the multinational debtor’s property within its territory—a
state of the world reflecting the theory of territorialism. 18 True centralization
would only be possible in a universalist system in which there would be a
single bankruptcy law and bankruptcy forum: i.e., universal market
symmetry for multinational debtors. 19 Because universalism remains purely
theoretical, both territorialists and universalists recognize that market
symmetry can be approximated by inter-court cooperation. That is,
centralization is possible to the extent that the nations with competing
jurisdiction over the multinational debtor’s property can coordinate their
proceedings.
Some have argued that this coordination should be driven by creditors’
ex post assessment of whether such cooperation is desirable—a theory
described as “cooperative territorialism.” 20 That is, inter-court cooperation
can occur once the debtor is in bankruptcy and the interested parties
determine that some degree of cross-border cooperation would maximize the
value of the estate. This has been accomplished in some significant cases,

16. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 477–78 (1994).
17. See generally Andrew B. Dawson, Better than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 137 (2016)
(describing the use of state “bankruptcy” laws and their limitations).
18. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2240–41 (2000).
19. Westbrook, supra note 15, at 2287.
20. LoPucki, supra note 18.
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with parties agreeing to a set of cooperation protocols, for example,
coordinating procedures for filing claims or selling assets. 21
Others have argued that the decision to cooperate should be made ex
ante, with nations committing to inter-court cooperation. This approach,
known as “modified universalism,” promises greater certainty and
predictability. 22 One single proceeding in the debtor’s “home” jurisdiction is
to play the lead role. Representatives of that estate in the home proceeding
may then open secondary (or “ancillary”) proceedings in other jurisdictions
as needed to administer the entire estate. These ancillary proceedings would
not be full bankruptcy cases. Instead, they would serve primarily to permit
the home jurisdiction’s orders to apply worldwide.
If we visualize the architecture of these different approaches, we can
see the cooperative territorialism envisions a highly-interconnected approach
to resolving the issue of cross-border cooperation. Cooperation would be
multi-party and multi-jurisdiction, with “full” bankruptcies in each
jurisdiction. Modified universalism, on the other hand, creates a hub-andspoke model of cross-border insolvency, with a “full” bankruptcy
proceeding in one jurisdiction and ancillary proceedings around the
perimeter. See Figure 1.

Modified universalism promises a more predictable and certain
procedure for cross-border insolvency, as it both limits the number of
21. See BRUCE LEONARD, INT’L INSOLVENCY INST., CO-ORDINATING CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY
CASES
(2001),
https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/Coordinating_Cross_Border_Insolvency_Leonard.pd
f [https://perma.cc/PF9M-J6U8].
22. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 625,
626 (2005); Westbrook, supra note 15, at 2302.
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interactions among courts and creates a regularized procedure for handling
those interactions. As described in the next part, the Model Law reflects this
modified universalism theory, with the aims of promoting cooperation and
greater predictability. 23
B. The Model Law’s Cross-Border Insolvency System
The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, promulgated by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
reflects this modified universalist theory. 24 If a multinational debtor files
bankruptcy in jurisdiction A, that jurisdiction can then authorize a “foreign
representative” to open ancillary proceedings in other jurisdictions as
needed. There is thus one single “full” bankruptcy proceeding whose
jurisdictional reach can be extended via ancillary proceedings in other
countries.
The Model Law has two primary means for how an ancillary court can
extend the reach of the foreign full bankruptcy. First, there is a set of relief
that is to be granted automatically to a foreign representative once certain
statutory rules are triggered (Automatic Assistance). Second, there is a set of
discretionary relief that an ancillary court may extend to the foreign
bankruptcy representative (Discretionary Assistance).
While the following parts are not comprehensive, they illustrate the
basic parameters of these two categories of relief. The key point here is not
the exact details of the categories; rather, the key point for this Article—
which, after all, is focused on the structural design of the Model Law—is in
outlining the two mechanisms that regulate inter-court assistance.
1. Automatic Assistance
The Model Law instructs that an ancillary court shall grant certain
assistance automatically so long as certain procedural and substantive
requirements are met. These provisions, found in articles 15 and 17, are
23. The Model Law’s Preamble lists its objectives:
(a) Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this State and foreign
States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency;
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade an investment;
(c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of
all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor;
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets; and
(e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment
and preserving employment.
MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 3.
24. See id.
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principally that (a) the “foreign proceeding” authorized the “foreign
representative” to seek relief and (b) that the foreign proceeding is a “foreign
main proceeding,” i.e., that the foreign full bankruptcy case is located where
the debtor has its “center of main interests.”
In other words, the ancillary court grants certain assistance
automatically upon validating the authenticity of the representative (was she
appointed by a foreign proceeding) and the appropriateness of the forum
jurisdiction (was it filed where the debtor has its center of main interests).
The linchpin of this analysis is the jurisdictional part—how should a court
determine the “center of main interests” of a multinational debtor? Although
there is some dispute as to the application of this standard, it is generally
agreed that the standard aims to comport with creditors’ expectations:
creditors of a Brazilian-based company would lend money expecting that
Brazilian debtor-creditor law would apply. 25
Once the ancillary court makes this finding, certain automatic
“centralizing” features are triggered as set forth in article 20: the ancillary
court issues a stay against all actions against the debtor, actions against the
debtor’s assets, and against all dispositions of the debtor’s assets. 26
2. Discretionary Assistance
The Model Law provides that an ancillary court may grant additional
relief to the foreign representative. This discretionary relief includes the
expanding the bankruptcy stay, assisting with discovery efforts within the
ancillary jurisdiction, and entrusting local assets to be administered or
distributed in the foreign full proceeding. 27 To be eligible for discretionary
relief, there are two principal restrictions (and a third which applies only as
to foreign nonmain proceedings). First, the foreign proceeding must either
be a “foreign main proceeding” (as noted above, filed where the debtor has
its center of main interests) or a “foreign nonmain proceeding” (i.e., filed
where the debtor conducts “non-transitory economic activity”). In the
parlance of the Model Law, the foreign representative can only obtain
discretionary relief if the foreign full bankruptcy was filed where the debtor
has at least an “establishment.”
Second, there are substantive restrictions designed to protect creditors.
Those protections depend on the type of relief sought and on the type of
foreign proceeding. The baseline substantive protection for creditors is found
25. See In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 83, 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
26. MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 10–11.
27. Id. at 11–12.
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in article 22(a): “the court must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors
and other interested persons, including the debtor, are adequately
protected.” 28 To that end, the court is permitted to place conditions on any
discretionary relief. 29 On top of this baseline rule, the Model Law provides
additional restrictions when the foreign representative asks the ancillary
court to turn over local assets to be distributed in the foreign proceeding. In
that case, the Model Law directs the court specifically to examine the
interests of local creditors. 30 Finally, before granting relief to a foreign
nonmain proceeding—i.e., a foreign proceeding where the debtor has an
establishment but not its center of main interests—there is one more
requirement. The court must make a mini choice-of-law determination: it
may issue orders as to local assets only when, under the local choice of law
rules, those assets should properly be administered in that foreign court; and
the ancillary court may issue discovery orders only if satisfied that it relates
to information required in that foreign nonmain proceeding. 31
Finally, even if the conditions for discretionary relief are satisfied, the
Model Law contains a public policy override. 32 To address concerns about
politically unpalatable losses—e.g., if jurisdiction A permitted rejection of
collective bargaining agreements while jurisdiction B did not 33—then the
Model Law gives a nod towards territorialist concerns. It permits ancillary
courts to refuse to cooperate with a foreign proceeding if doing so would be
“manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the ancillary jurisdiction. 34
Thus, the ancillary court in jurisdiction B may refuse to defer to jurisdiction
A’s treatment of collective bargaining agreements.
While this public policy override may apply, in theory, to both
automatic and discretionary assistance, U.S. bankruptcy courts have favored
reserving this override to matters in the discretionary realm—an approach
not specifically dictated by the Model Law, but one consistent with the
categories of relief. 35 It is hard to imagine a situation in which imposing a
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Treatment of employees is one of the most politically divisive issues in international
bankruptcy. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, at 131,
U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) (“[T]he relationship between employee and employer raises some of
the most difficult questions in insolvency law.”).
34. MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 5 (“Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take
an action governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of this
State.”).
35. See, e.g., In re Creative Finance Ltd., 543 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).

688

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 93:3

stay on collection activities would violate public policy; it is more likely that
public policy concerns would arise as to the broader discretionary relief. For
example, public policy exceptions have been found when the U.S. ancillary
court was asked to turn over private email passwords, in contravention of the
Electronics Communication Privacy Act. 36
II. THE MODULAR MODEL LAW
Professor Westbrook has argued that institutional and procedural
structure of the Model Law creates a cross-border system, and not merely a
set of international standards. 37 To the extent courts have made mistakes
implementing the Model Law, part of that stems from the failure to interpret
it as a “system text.” 38 This section examines the design structure of the
Model Law system, arguing that the Model Law is best understood as
modularizing the complex system of cross-border insolvency. First, this
section describes the principles of modular design structures. Second, it then
re-casts the Model Law’s design structure as reflecting modularity
principles. This re-casting will involve a more in-depth examination of the
Model Law’s text—in particular, the rules for determining when the
ancillary court should grant automatic relief and the standards for
determining when it should grant discretionary relief.
A. Modular Design
Modularity is a means for managing complex systems. 39 It is
characterized by breaking down a system into semi-autonomous units that
then interact through a set of defined protocols that limit the flow of
information (or other interactions) among those units. 40 These units are semiautonomous to the extent that there are few inter-connections among the
units and to the extent those inter-connections restrict the flow of information
among the units. This “information hiding” feature is critical: merely
limiting the number of interactions among modules is not enough; rather, the
interface protocols that govern the interaction of the modules must restrict
the flow of information. 41

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Westbrook, supra note 4.
See id.
Langlois, supra note 1.
Smith, supra note 2, at 1180.
Id. at 1177.
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Modularity, in this way, can be understood as a “method of reducing
dependence on context.” 42 If a system is modularized, changes in one unit
will have limited consequences on the system overall. In an integrated
system, in contrast, a change in one unit can cause the whole system to stop.
Modularity has been fundamental to designing everything from computer
systems to merger-and-acquisition transactions. But at this point, an
oversimplified example may be helpful for laying out this basic idea.
Consider the two general formats for television series. Some shows, like
Game of Thrones, are serial programs, meaning that events in one episode
will be connected to events in later episodes. 43 You have to watch the whole
series to really follow the story. On the other hand, procedural shows, like
Law & Order, are composed of relatively self-contained episodes. A viewer
can watch these episodes in random order and suffer no plot confusion. 44
Because of this limited flow of information across episodes, procedural
television series can be considered modular in character. What happens in
episode 1 is self-contained, with little-to-no information flowing into episode
2. Thus, Law & Order is more modular that Game of Thrones. And because
modularity is a matter of degree, there are examples of shows that fall in the
middle, that is, that have some information flow across episodes but not
enough to require serial viewing. Hill Street Blues may be an example of
that—a show which pushed the serialized style into a procedural format, with
unprecedented success. 45
Continuing with this example, we can see the pros and cons of
modularity. Modularity is helpful for the casual viewer, who can drop in on
episodes at random and not have to keep track of past plotlines and character
developments. It is also helpful for the show’s producers. Not only does the
standalone nature of such episodes make them more marketable in
syndication, but it also allows for greater experimentation. For example, fans
42. Id. at 1207.
43. Brad Adgate, Serialized TV Is All the Rage this Fall, FORBES (May 16, 2014, 9:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2014/05/16/serialized-tv-is-all-the-rage-this-fall
[https://perma.cc/L83X-PHX6].
44. To be sure, even in procedural television series, there may be character development, inside
jokes, or other connections to be drawn between episodes. Modularity, as discussed below, is not absolute,
but may be a matter of degree. The more interconnections between episodes, the less modular the series.
45. Hat tip to Jay Westbrook for offering the example of Hill Street Blues as a semi-modular
structure, a show that has been called “the most influential TV show ever.” Todd Leopold, ‘Hill Street
Blues’: The Most Influential TV Show Ever, CNN (May 1, 2014, 4:56 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/29/showbiz/tv/hill-street-blues-oral-history/index.html
[https://perma.cc/87JV-VK5G]. The Good Wife has been described as having serialized and procedural
elements: a viewer can “drop in” on any episode and follow along but will likely miss the nuances that a
dedicated viewer would catch. Heather Mason, Breaking Down the Differences Between Procedural and
Serialized Shows, GEEK & SUNDRY (June 10, 2015), http://geekandsundry.com/procedural-versusserialized-television/ [https://perma.cc/GG46-BDS8].
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of the proceduralized comedy Seinfeld will recall “The Chinese Restaurant”
episode that centered solely on the characters waiting to get a table. 46 This
episode was considered quite avant-garde at the time—almost too much so,
as NBC resisted even airing it. 47 The proceduralized nature of the show,
though, lowered the risks for a major network to experiment in this way—it
could then (and did) return back to its more standard format for the next
episode. The producers could also experiment with secondary characters
(often celebrity guests) who could appear in one episode, never to appear or
be discussed again.
On the other hand, procedural television shows are less able to develop
long plot lines and characters. The most popular television shows in recent
years have eschewed the proceduralized format in favor of serialized formats
precisely for this reason. The modern “golden age of television” has delved
into long story arcs, tackling major social issues such as criminal justice
(think The Wire) and plot twists. 48 The arc of these stories simply could not
fit into self-contained episodes.
The pros and cons of modularity, as explained through television show
formats, hold true in a variety of contexts: modularity reduces the costs of
innovation and assembly, but it may come at a cost of overall quality. We
have observed this tradeoff in understanding behavioral psychology, in
manufacturing and engineering, and even in private legal ordering. For
example, Herbert Simon has described how our tendency to make life
decisions in isolation, rather than seeing how these decisions may be interconnected, is an important and essential tool for allowing us to simplify
decisions in a way commensurate with our cognitive limitations. 49 That is,
by (wrongly) breaking down big decisions into self-contained, isolated
46. Seinfeld: The Chinese Restaurant (Shapiro/West Productions May 23, 1991).
47. See Lindsay Kimble, NBC Hated ‘The Chinese Restaurant’ and Other Facts and Easter Eggs
About the ‘Seinfeld’ Classic, UPROXX (Sept. 17, 2015), http://uproxx.com/hidden/seinfeld-the-chineserestaurant-fun-facts [https://perma.cc/TGY7-CKQJ] (quoting Michael Richards, who played Kramer and
did not appear in this episode, as saying, “‘The Chinese Restaurant’ episode was so unique that I just
wanted to be a part of that uniqueness because it was cutting edge. I knew that was a very important
episode.”); Larry Fitzmaurice, All 169 Seinfeld Episodes Ranked from Worst to Best: Saying a Lot About
the Show About Nothing, VULTURE (June 24, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vulture.com/2015/06/everyseinfeld-episode-ranked.html [https://perma.cc/W24H-CSU6] (describing the episode “as
groundbreaking as Seinfeld gets”).
48. See Thomas Doherty, Storied TV: Cable Is the New Novel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 17,
2012), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Cable-Is-the-New-Novel/134420 [https://perma.cc/M9WYRR6M].
49. HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 17–23 (1983) (discussing bounded
rationality as a feature for handling complexity). Even though many of our life decisions are
interconnected, we don’t see them that way. Rather, we tend to see them in isolation. He acknowledges
that bounded rationality often means our decisions are suboptimal and perhaps inconsistent but extols this
all the same.
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decisions, we may sacrifice subjective expected utility; however, it is the
only way that we can “get along in a world that is much too complicated to
be understood from the Olympian viewpoint of [Subjective Expected Utility]
theory.” 50
We have examined this tradeoff in manufacturing as well. The
development of computer systems provides a good illustration. A computer,
of course, is a complex system with many components that all work together
to permit the system to operate: memory units, processors, input ports, output
ports, and other components. 51 When computers were first marketed to
consumers, these components were all highly dependent on one another. A
technological advance in processors, for example, would require modifying
the other components as well. 52 Consumers could not upgrade any one part
without upgrading the whole. 53 Now, of course, consumers can buy new
memory separately for their computer, for example, without having to buy
new a new processor. The components still work together as a whole, but the
components are designed to be relatively independent from the others. The
interaction between one component and another is highly standardized, such
that parts can easily be swapped out without requiring a system overhaul.
This modularization was a major step forward in computer industry. 54 At the
same time, modularity means more parts and more interaction between those
parts. The more moving parts, the more opportunity for things to go wrong.
An integrated system might have fewer glitches and be able to work more
efficiently. 55
These dynamics have also been explored in the way parties may
structure their legal relationships. For example, Henry Smith has used
modularity to explain the role of contract boilerplate. 56 Contracts are
generally viewed as information-intensive, privately-negotiated agreements
between the parties. 57 If a single provision in a contract were removed, that
50. Id. at 23.
51. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 84.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. D.P. Siewiorek & M.R. Barbacci, Some Observations on Modular Design Technology and the
Use of Microprogramming, in MICROPROGRAMMING AND SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 509 (Infotech Info.,
State of the Art Report No. 23, 1975) (“A design using module sets tends to be slower and costlier in
terms of hardware than a comparable system designed with [integrated] components.”).
56. Smith, supra note 2.
57. K & D Holdings, LLC v. Equitrans, L.P., 812 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2015) (“A severable
contract is one that is ‘susceptible of division and apportionment,’ while a contract that is not severable
has material provisions and consideration that ‘are common each to the other and interdependent.’
(quoting Dixie Appliance Co. v. Bourne, 77 S.E.2d 879, 881 (W. Va. 1953)); 15 RICHARD A. LORD,
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would affect the whole contract. Hence, the common law presumption that
contracts are not severable—if a single part of the contract is found
unenforceable, the contract as a whole is presumed unenforceable. 58
Boilerplate provisions, in contrast, are transferable from one contract to the
next. They can be modified within a contract without systemic
consequences, e.g., changing a choice of forum clause would not likely
require restructuring other parts of the contract. It is precisely this
interchangeability and adaptability that make boilerplate cheaper than
customer-tailored contract provisions. 59
Similarly, modularity also helps explain the role of asset partitioning in
debtor-creditor relations. 60 A borrower can disaggregate firmwide risk by
separating related assets into separate groups in order to lower the cost of
capital. A firm with two different lines of business, theorized Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, might separate those two lines of business
into two distinct legal entities. 61 They give the example of a firm with both
an oil business and a hotel business. By separating the two businesses,
creditors of the oil business do not need to worry about the hotel business
(with which they are presumably less familiar), and vice versa. This will
lower creditors’ monitoring costs and, consequently, reduce the cost of
capital. 62 While they do not use the language of modularity in their analysis,
the concept is implicit. Asset partitioning allows for limiting information
flow, making it unnecessary for oil creditor to worry about happenings in the
hotel business. 63
The key characteristic of modularity in each of these areas is that it
reduces context dependency, but at the potential cost of creating more
interfaces between subunits. Modularity is a matter of degree, and there may
exist an ideal degree of modularity that limits context dependency without
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 45:4 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2016), Westlaw (database updated May 2017)
(“There is a presumption against finding a contract divisible unless divisibility is expressly stated in the
contract itself, or the intent of the parties to treat the contract as divisible is otherwise clearly manifested.”
(footnotes omitted)).
58. Smith, supra note 2, at 1191; K & D Holdings, LLC, 812 F.3d at 339; 15 LORD, supra note 57.
59. Smith, supra note 2, at 1191.
60. Id. at 1187 (“Even asset-partitioning can be viewed as an example of information-hiding and
modularization: organizational law allows the information about the owner’s dealings with his creditors
to be irrelevant to the enterprise’s contractual partners and sometimes makes information about the
business’s dealings irrelevant to the owner’s creditors.”).
61. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 12.
62. Id.
63. Anthony Casey argues that the oil creditor might want to know about some happenings in the
hotel business and theorizes on the role of cross-entity liabilities and guarantees that would give the oil
creditor the option of enforcing its interest in the oil assets based on a default in the hotel business. Casey,
supra note 12, at 2693–94.
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creating too many interactions or over-simplifying complex problems.
Returning again to the television series analogy, it may be that a television
series can be modular enough to attract casual viewers without being so
modular as to limit long plot or character arcs.
B. Modularity in Cross-Border Insolvency
Modularity can provide a useful lens through which to examine crossborder insolvency regimes. At root, cross-border insolvency is a very
complex choice of law problem: which country’s bankruptcy law(s) should
apply to the multinational debtor’s worldwide estate? And because the
resolution of this problem involves tribunals in multiple jurisdictions, this
complex choice of law question involves multiple decision-makers. To
assess the modularity of this multi-part framework requires focusing on the
amount of information flow among these parts—the more information flow,
the less modular, and vice versa.
First, as to the multipart structure, the structure of the Model Law at
least looks like the sort of modularity structure we described in Figure 1. The
components of the cross-border insolvency system are the court proceedings.
While a television series is by its nature composed of multiple episodes,
cross-border insolvency systems are composed of multiple components out
of political necessity. There is no single international bankruptcy tribunal
with worldwide jurisdiction over the multinational debtor’s estate, thus
making it necessary to open multiple bankruptcy proceedings in various
jurisdictions to administer assets and bind creditors worldwide. Whether the
Model Law’s “episodes” are modular depends on the amount of information
flow among those several proceedings. If internal developments within
bankruptcy proceeding in jurisdiction A has consequences for the
proceedings in B and C, then the Model Law is much more like a serial TV
show than a procedural one. The key is to examine how information flows
from one unit to the next.
As to the information flow, it is necessary to examine the set of interface
protocols, governing not only the quantity of inter-court interactions but also
the information-hiding quality of those interactions. To this end, we will turn
back to the Model Law’s two main interface protocols—Automatic
Assistance and Discretionary Assistance.
This section argues that these two sets of protocols—the protocol for
Automatic Assistance and that for Discretionary Assistance—can be
understood as serving an information-hiding function, that is, to reflect a
degree of modularity. The information-hiding is not constant across these
protocols. When dealing with Automatic Assistance, the protocols hide a
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great deal of information; less so with Discretionary Assistance. Modularity,
as described above, is a matter of degree—and that degree provides both
explanatory and prescriptive guidance for the application of the Model Law.
1. Automatic Assistance
This section argues that the Model Law’s rules governing Automatic
Assistance are highly modular, i.e., they greatly reduce the outcome’s
dependency upon context by hiding information from the ancillary courts.
Although not articulated in this way, the language of the Model Law, its
Guide to Enactment, and U.S. court cases interpreting chapter 15 all reflect
this “information-hiding” function of the Automatic Assistance protocols.
As discussed above, an ancillary court is to grant automatic relief to the
foreign representative if the court finds that the foreign proceeding is a
foreign main proceeding, among other requirements. Most important in this
suite of relief is the automatic stay, which provides perhaps the strongest tool
to facilitate centralized administration of the debtor’s estate. 64
While the basic requirements for Automatic Assistance may appear to
invite a factually intensive inquiry, the Model Law has several provisions
that restrict the flow of information here through two strategies: broad
definitions and statutory presumptions. Definition-wise, the Model Law
defines “foreign proceeding” and “foreign representative” broadly. These
broad definitions make it much harder for parties to raise arguments that a
foreign bankruptcy proceeding is ineligible for relief because its insolvency
proceedings are extra-judicial or ex parte, problems that has arisen under the
pre-Model Law case law. 65 As explained in the UNCITRAL Guide to
Enactment and Interpretation, this definition was drafted “to refer broadly to
proceedings involving debtors that are in severe financial distress or
insolvent.” 66 The drafters’ concern was that different legal systems use
different terminology, and they wanted to make sure that these differences
did not cause courts to determine that a proceeding was a “foreign
proceeding” because it, for example, failed to use the word “bankruptcy” or
“insolvency.” 67
64. MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 10–11; see id. at 83.
65. See Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the
Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 203 (1992) (discussing
Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freight of the M/VS Venture Star, 878 F.2d 111, 112 (3d Cir. 1989), in which
the court determined that Australian proceeding did not merit comity under section 304 because its
insolvency proceedings were “essentially ex parte”). Challenges were likewise raised (unsuccessfully)
on this ground under chapter 15 in In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd., 445 B.R. 318, 328 (Bankr. D. Del.
2010), aff’d, 728 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2013).
66. MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 38–39.
67. Id. at 38.
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Similarly, the drafters defined “foreign representative” broadly so as to
include debtors-in-possession, a party authorized by the court, or a party
appointed by a special agency. 68 Again, the broad definition makes it harder
to raise information-intensive litigation over whether a foreign
representative qualifies for relief. In other words, the broad definitions
provide little need for the ancillary court to peer inside the foreign
proceeding. 69
In addition to broad definitions, the Model Law uses statutory
presumptions to limit the flow of information at the Additional Assistance
interface. Article 16 of the Model Law creates presumptions that the foreign
proceeding and foreign representative requirements are met; that documents
submitted by the foreign representative are authentic; and, most importantly,
that the debtor’s center of main interests (COMI) is where it has its registered
office. 70
This last presumption concerning the debtor’s COMI is of fundamental
importance to the Automatic Assistance protocols, since the court must find
not only that the foreign representative was duly authorized by a foreign
proceeding but also that the foreign proceeding is occurring where the debtor
has its center of main interests—a term that is otherwise undefined in the
Model Law. The vagueness of this COMI determination has been the
primary source of criticism about the Model Law (and one of the principal
topics addressed in this literature). 71 In the face of this vagueness, the Model
Law’s rebuttable presumption that a debtor’s COMI is where it has its
registered office greatly limits the information flow in the Automatic
Assistance protocol.
While there is certainly potential for the COMI standard to be
interpreted in an information-intensive way, this has not been the trend in the
U.S. case law. Consider the case of In re Creative Finance Ltd. as an example
68. Id. at 46.
69. There have been challenges raised as to whether parties qualify as foreign representatives, but
these have been unsuccessful. See Ad Hoc Grp. of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. (In re Vitro
S.A.B. de C.V.), 701 F.3d 1031, 1046 (5th Cir. 2012); In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 83, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2015) (holding that “authorization” does not require judicial or statutory but could be satisfied by showing
that the corporation (or debtor in possession) had authorized the foreign representative).
70. MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 8.
71. See e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1019 (2007); Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (2005); John A.E.
Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 785 (2007); Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317 (2009); Kyu Paek, COMI
of Offshore Funds, Revisited, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2017, at 30; Alexandra CC Ragan, Comment,
COMI Strikes a Discordant Note: Why U.S. Courts Are Not in Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15
Directives, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 117, 117 (2010); Oscar N. Pinkas & James A. Copeland, In Re
Creative Finance: Not So Creative on COMIs, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July 2016, at 30, 30.
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of courts’ commitment to the information-hiding function of the Automatic
Assistance protocol. The case involved two British Virgin Islands (BVI)incorporated funds that engaged in what the chapter 15 court described as
“the most blatant effort to hinder, delay and defraud a creditor this Court has
ever seen.” 72 Prior to their liquation proceedings, the funds conducted most
of their business in the United Kingdom and conducted most of their
operations from Spain and Dubai. When the debtors were sued in the United
Kingdom and a $5 million judgment was about to be entered, the principal
moved all of the debtors’ liquid assets to the BVI then placed the funds into
insolvency proceedings there. When the BVI liquidator filed a chapter 15
petition in the United States, the bankruptcy court denied the petition not
because of the multiple badges of fraud (which would require a fact-intensive
analysis) but because no activity had taken place in the BVI. Without any
activity in the BVI, there is no way it had its COMI there. 73 In so ruling, the
court emphasized its objective analysis by noting that “[a]s offended as the
Court is by the Debtors’ conduct here,” it was inappropriate to engage in
more subjective factors, such as whether the case was filed in bad faith or
whether it violated public policy. 74 Those issues, the court ruled, would be
handled, if at all, in the protocols for discretionary relief.
In summary, the Automatic Assistance recognition protocol might
appear to be information-intensive, but its broad definitions and statutory
presumptions work to hide information from the ancillary proceeding.
Applying this protocol, we have seen U.S. courts refuse to engage in more
information-intensive analysis, leaving the factual analysis to the more opentextured Discretionary Assistance protocol.
2. Discretionary Assistance
The Discretionary Assistance interface protocol is more informationintensive than that for Automatic Assistance—and exactly how informationintensive has been a matter of considerable disagreement. Modularity, after
all, is a relative concept. As shown in this part, the degree of modularity in
the Discretionary Assistance interface depends in large part on the type of
assistance sought and the nature of a foreign proceeding as main or nonmain.
Article 21 provides the type of discretionary relief available to a foreign
representative upon recognition “where necessary to protect the assets of the
debtor or the interests of the creditors.” 75 Applying this provision under
72.
73.
74.
75.

In re Creative Finance Ltd., 543 B.R. 498, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 515.
MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 11.
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chapter 15, a U.S. bankruptcy court may, for example, extend the automatic
stay to protect insiders or affiliates; freeze U.S.-based assets; provide for
discovery powers; entrust U.S. assets for administration by the foreign court;
or “grant[ ] additional relief that may be available to [a trustee].” 76
Article 22 provides some limitations on that assistance, broadly, and
article 21 provides some specific limitations. Article 22 requires that, before
granting any Discretionary Assistance, “the court must be satisfied that the
interests of the creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor,
are adequately protected.” 77 The United States changed this standard to
“sufficiently protected” in order to prevent any confusion with the term
“adequate protection” as defined elsewhere in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. I
will likewise use the term “sufficiently protected.” Further, it allows the
court to place conditions on any such relief and to modify or terminate such
relief. 78
The “sufficiently protected” standard is much more open-textured than
the COMI standard: there is no definition of this standard nor any
presumptions at all. Instead, the standard invites the ancillary court to
explore the facts of the case, determining not only that the relief would
protect local creditors but also whether it would protect the debtor. That is,
it requires the ancillary court to look at the big picture of the multinational
debtor’s cross-border insolvency.
On top of the sufficiently protected standard, article 21 imposes
additional requirements. First, before entrusting local assets to be distributed
in the foreign proceeding, the court must be “satisfied that the interests of
creditors in this State are adequately protected.” 79 In other words, when
deciding whether to send local assets to a foreign proceeding, the ancillary
court must consider specifically the interests of the local creditors. The local
ancillary court, thus, is specifically authorized (and required) to consider
local creditors, even if the requested relief would benefit the world-wide
administration of the debtor’s estate.
Second, before granting any Discretionary Assistance to a foreign
representative from a foreign nonmain proceeding, the court must engage in
a deeper factual inquiry: (1) before entrusting assets to be administered
abroad, the court must determine that, under local choice-of-law rules, the
76. Id.
77. Id. at 12. Note, the United States changed the standard to “sufficiently protected,” as “adequate
protection” is a term of art under the Bankruptcy Code. The intent, though, was to simply avoid confusion,
not to depart from the Model Law. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115.
78. MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 12.
79. Id. at 11.
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local assets should be administered in that foreign nonmain proceeding; and
(2) before granting discovery orders, the local court must be determined that
the order would relate to information actually required in that foreign
nonmain proceeding. 80
As to the foreign nonmain proceedings, the Discretionary Assistance
interface has a choice-of-law element to it. The Guide explains that this
requirement seeks to ensure that foreign nonmain proceedings do not
interfere with main ones. 81 Again, applying this requirement to a
hypothetical application under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, it seems
to assume a scenario in which a debtor has filed a foreign main proceeding
in jurisdiction A and a nonmain proceeding in jurisdiction B. If the B
representative seeks assistance from a U.S. bankruptcy court under chapter
15, that court should take care that any requested relief does not interfere
with the foreign main proceeding in A. 82 The emphasis that the U.S. court
should make this determination “under the law of [the United States],” the
Guide explains, is meant to reflect the principle that “recognition of a foreign
proceeding entails attaching to the foreign proceeding consequences
envisaged by the law [of the United States].” 83 That is, when choosing
whether it is appropriate to grant discretionary relief to a foreign nonmain
proceeding, the chapter 15 court is to make that determination under U.S.
choice-of-law rules.
The Discretionary Assistance interface, then, requires more factual
determination than that for Automatic Assistance—and the amount of that
factual determination varies mostly based on whether the ancillary court is
being asked to assist with a foreign main or nonmain proceeding and based
on the nature of the requested assistance. Foreign nonmain proceedings
require a choice-of-law analysis, foreign main proceedings do not. General
discretionary assistance requires courts to consider broadly the interests of
all parties. When that discretionary assistance involves sending local assets
to be administered abroad, the court is directed to consider specifically the
interests of local creditors.

80. Id. at 12.
81. Id. at 88–89.
82. Id. (“The objective is to advise the court that relief in favour of a foreign non-main proceeding
should not give unnecessarily broad powers to the foreign representative and that such relief should not
interfere with the administration of another insolvency proceeding, in particular the main proceeding.”).
83. Id. at 89.
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C. Summary
Along a modularity spectrum, then, Automatic Assistance is the most
modular, Discretionary Assistance as to foreign nonmain proceedings is the
least modular, and Discretionary Assistance as to foreign main proceedings
is in the middle. See Figure 2. If Automatic Assistance protocols are like
Law & Order, and Discretionary Assistance for foreign nonmain
proceedings are like Game of Thrones, then the Discretionary Assistance for
foreign main proceedings is like Hill Street Blues—there is sufficient
information flow across “episodes” to permit plot and character depth, but
not so much as to require complete commitment to watching every episode.

In other words, we see varying degrees of information hiding. That
information hiding has pros and cons, just as modularization generally does.
It permits experimentation and innovation with limited system-wide effects.
For example, consider what happens when one country amends its own
insolvency laws. Such an internal change does not undermine the
predictability of the Automatic Assistance protocol: information about that
change is hidden from the ancillary proceeding. The only cost to that is that
it does not permit much nuance at this level; however, this is a low cost when
it comes to Automatic Assistance, as that assistance is limited primarily to
staying collection activities (and not distributing assets). Discretionary
Assistance’s less-modular protocol allows for the ancillary court to consider
that import of the country’s new insolvency laws. It might drive the ancillary
court to be more willing to entrust assets abroad, for instance. But that level
of information intensity also increases the costs of administering the system.
III. WEAKNESSES IN MODULAR STRUCTURE
Principles of modularity can help explain the way the Model Law is
structured, and they can also help us think systematically about the
challenges that have arisen when implementing the Model Law. The Model
Law was designed to limit both the number of interactions among courts and
the information-intensity of those interactions. Many of the Model Law’s
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problems can be understood as its inability to limit the number and quality
of those interactions, i.e., the implementation problems can be understood as
the Model Law’s imperfect modularization. This part will consider these two
types of problems: quantity of interactions and quality of interactions, which
can be represented in the following diagram depicting the modular ideal of
the Model Law above the two types of modularity imperfections.

A. Quantity of Interactions
Whereas the Model Law envisions limiting interactions only to those
between the ancillary and the full foreign bankruptcy proceeding, this is not
always possible when the Model Law is plugged into local insolvency
systems or when the foreign debtor is a corporate group. In these situations,
there may be interactions between systems—that is, between the Model
Law’s cross-border insolvency system and the local court’s broader
insolvency system—as well as between potentially overlapping insolvencies
within the corporate group. Each of these problems will be discussed in turn.
1. Inter-System Interactions
Although the Model Law deals with interactions between the ancillary
and foreign proceedings, the Model Law itself may interact with other legal
systems. For example, the cross-border insolvency system may intersect with
the international arbitration system if the debtor were subject to arbitration
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agreements. 84 The Model Law system may also interact in unexpected ways
with the local bankruptcy system. When this happens, there are more
interactions that the Model Law envisions, and the result is that the system
is less modularized.
Adrian Walters’s contribution to this issue, in some ways, examines this
imperfect modularization, as the Model Law requires local judges to also put
on a global hat. This issue also draws on the broader issues of legal
transplantation: statutory uniformity among the nations that have adopted the
Model Law does not translate into uniformity in practice. 85 That is,
differences in methods of statutory interpretation and in styles of case
management may lead courts to implement the same text in very different
ways. This may happen alongside concerns for local interests or entirely
independently.
For this section, I offer an example that is perhaps more mundane (and
is likely less consequential) but that highlights well the interaction between
the Model Law and the local bankruptcy law. Drawbridge Special
Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet) illustrates the difficulty of
integrating the Model Law with the local bankruptcy law, in this case, the
United States Bankruptcy Code. 86 The case seemed like an easy one, at least
as applied to the Automatic Assistance protocol: the debtor was an
Australian firm that was liquidating in Australia and filed a chapter 15
petition in the United States. There was no dispute as to the debtor’s COMI.
Yet, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petition for
relief must be rejected because the debtor did not satisfy the Bankruptcy
Code eligibility rules.
Those eligibility rules govern who may be a debtor under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Section 109(a) limits eligibility to “a person that resides
or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a
municipality.” 87 Here, the Australian-based debtor had no known assets in
the United States. It had filed the chapter 15 petition in order to gain
discovery assistance in an effort to track down company assets. Because it
84. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Arbitration and Multinational Insolvency, 29 PENN ST.
INT’L L. REV. 635, 638 (2011).
85. For a broader discussion highlighting the importance of legal culture in comparative law, see
Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
269, 273 (1999) (“These are problems of translation, problems of understanding the institutional context
in which the rules of corporate law operate, and problems of understanding the cultural context within
which rules of corporate law apply.”). For a narrower discussion on the importance of legal methods, see
Dawson, supra note 6, and Walters, supra note 6.
86. Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.
2013).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
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had no assets, the court concluded that, under a plain meaning interpretation
of section 109(a), the petition had to be denied. 88 The court found this to be
so even though section 109(a) deals with who may be a “debtor,” and the
foreign representatives in a chapter 15 case are not “debtors.” That is, the
court did not recognize that chapter 15 is different—it is not an in rem
proceeding, unlike proceedings under other chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code. 89
The result is decidedly contrary to the Model Law’s aims and principles,
yet the court found it to be the direct result of a plain reading of the
Bankruptcy Code. This case has been heavily criticized. 90 The decision is
also of little importance as debtors have very easily side-stepped this
requirement. 91 But for our purposes, it provides a relatively simple
illustration of the Model Law’s imperfect modularization: despite the efforts
to limit interactions between the ancillary and foreign bankruptcy
proceeding, ancillary courts must still interact with their own local
insolvency systems.
2. Intra-Debtor Connections
The Model Law not only fails to account for the inter-system
interactions that occur, as the ancillary court must apply the Model Law
within its domestic insolvency law framework, but it also fails to address the
interactions when the debtor consists of a group of related corporate entities.
The Model Law’s “center of main interests” test assumes that there is just
one main proceeding, leaving open the question of how to handle the
insolvency of a multinational debtor group. 92 The multinational debtor group
may consist of entities incorporated in multiple jurisdictions, such that each
entity may arguable have its own center of main interests. Should the
corporate group itself be deemed to have a single center of main interests (if
for procedural consolidation only, not substantive consolidation of the
entities)?
Consider the insolvency of the Brazilian telecommunications giant Oi
SA, which filed bankruptcy in Brazil in 2016. Oi SA is the parent company
88. Barnet, 737 F.3d at 247.
89. See In re Bemarmara Consulting a.s., No. 13-13037-KG (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 17, 2013).
90. See Dawson, supra note 6.
91. For example, the Australian liquidators subsequently filed a second chapter 15 petition, this
time in the form of an undrawn retainer with local counsel and in the form of a U.S. legal claims. In re
Octaviar Admin. Pty Ltd., No. 14-10438 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2014).
92. See Irit Mevorach, Cross-Border Insolvency of Enterprise Groups: The Choice of Law
Challenge, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107 (2014); Leif M. Clark, Managing Distribution to
Claimants in Cross-Border Enterprise Group Insolvency, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 20 (2014).
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of a large conglomerate which included a Netherlands-incorporate financing
entity Oi Brasil Holdings Coöperatief U.A. (“Coop”). 93 After Oi SA, Coop,
and several related entities commenced insolvency proceedings in Brazil, the
foreign representative sought chapter 15 assistance in the United States on
behalf of Coop and three other Oi entities. The court recognized the Brazilian
proceeding as a foreign main proceeding.
Around that same time, creditors of Coop (led by the distressed debt
hedge fund Aurelius Capital) commenced an involuntary insolvency
proceeding against Coop in the Netherlands. Following the U.S. recognition
order, Aurelius led an effort to have the Dutch case converted from a
reorganization-type proceeding to a liquidation, resulting in the appointment
of a trustee. The trustee then filed a chapter 15 petition in the United States
requesting that the Dutch proceeding now be recognized as the foreign main
proceeding. Thus, Coop was subject to arguably two foreign main
proceedings: that of the parent in Brazil and the Dutch proceeding.
Ultimately, the U.S. chapter 15 court refused to recognize the Dutch
proceedings both because Coop was simply a financing arm of the parent
company (and thus creditor expectations of COMI determination would
point to Brazil) and because Aurelius’s COMI-manipulation strategy was
improper. 94 Putting aside the (presumably) sui generis aspect of Aurelius’s
behavior, the case is a helpful one for highlighting the challenges of
corporate group insolvencies. As Irit Mevorach has noted, the Model Law’s
choice-of-forum rules may be well-suited for handling cases such as Oi, in
which there was a clear center of main interests for the corporate group;
however, if we change the facts just a little bit, the analysis becomes much
more complicated. 95 As Mevorach argues, centralizing a corporate group
insolvency is easier to justify in the case of integrated groups that are
controlled and managed centrally. 96 In contrast, full insolvency
centralization is harder to justify for groups that are decentralized, i.e., “the
group entities—all or some of them—are managed independently, with
significant autonomy in their respective jurisdictions, and are more loosely
controlled from a group headquarter.” 97 If Coop, for example, had actually
conducted business in the Netherlands and been something more than just a

93. The facts in this section are drawn from the Post-Trial Memorandum of Decision in the chapter
15 case of In re Oi Brasil Holdings Coöperatief U.A., 578 B.R. 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
94. Id. at 221–22.
95. Mevorach, supra note 92, at 116–17.
96. Id. at 117–19.
97. Id. at 119.
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special purpose financing vehicle for the Oi corporate group, the COMI
analysis would be much more difficult.
B. Intensity of Interactions
The Model Law not only seeks to limit the number of inter-court
interactions, it also seeks to limit the intensity of those interactions. And, as
discussed above, the degree of information-hiding varies according to the
interface protocols (Automatic Assistance versus Discretionary Assistance)
and according to the type of relief sought within the Discretionary Assistance
protocol. Empirically, from the U.S. experience with chapter 15, we have
seen that ancillary courts have been acted consistently with the Automatic
Assistance protocol’s information-hiding directive; however, there has been
considerable disagreement about the appropriate amount of informationhiding within the Discretionary Assistance protocol. 98 As reported in Jeremy
Leong’s empirical study of chapter 15 cases, courts have been reluctant to
entrust U.S. assets to foreign bankruptcy proceedings—and when they do so,
they almost always do so with qualifications to protect U.S. creditors. 99
In other words, while the Model Law appears successful at limiting the
intensity of interactions among courts when dealing with requests for
Automatic Assistance, it has been less successful at limiting information
flow with requests for Discretionary Assistance. As described by former
bankruptcy judge Allan Gropper, the “sufficiently protected” standard in the
Discretionary Assistance protocol seems to invite a choice-of-law analysis;
however, most courts rarely acknowledge that they are either explicitly or
implicitly making a choice-of-law decision. 100 Thus, we have some courts
engaging in a fact-intensive choice-of-law analysis and other courts simply
assuming a choice-of-law decision. The result is a discrepancy in the amount
of information the ancillary court should consider, i.e., in the degree of
information-hiding directed by the Discretionary Assistance protocol.
Consider here a recent example from the Second Circuit, in which the
court applied the Model Law to reach a result that is inconsistent with the
information-hiding features of the Discretionary Assistance protocol. The
result is that the court engaged in a more information-intensive analysis as
to a foreign main proceeding than it would have if it had dealt instead with a

98. Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence from United
States Bankruptcy Court Cases, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 110, 115 (2011); see also Dawson, supra note 71.
99. Leong, supra note 98, at 116.
100. See generally Allan L. Gropper, The Curious Disappearance of Choice of Law as an Issue in
Chapter 15 Cases, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57 (2014).
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foreign nonmain proceeding—a result that runs counter to the spectrum of
modularity posited in Part II.
In re Fairfield Sentry involved a sale of the assets of a British Virgin
Islands investment fund. 101 When the foreign representative of the BVI
liquidation sought to approve the sale in the United States, the question arose
whether the chapter 15 court had to conduct a de novo review of the BVI
sale or simply to rubber-stamp the sale. The controversy in the case was
based on the asset being sold: the investment fund had claims against
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. The foreign liquidator sold
the claims in the BVI for about a third of their face value. 102 A mere three
days after the sale, the claim purchaser received a huge windfall: the Madoff
Fund Trustee recovered a massive settlement agreement for $7.2 billion,
resulting in an immediate gain of $40 million for the claim purchaser. 103
The foreign representative of the BVI liquidator wanted the chapter 15
court to conduct a de novo review of the BVI sale, hoping that the court
would conclude that the sale price was inadequate and throw out the sale.
The purchaser, on the other hand, argued that the chapter 15 court’s role was
simply to review the BVI sale for procedural fairness.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit ruled that a de novo hearing was required
under chapter 15. 104 In doing so, the court relied on section 1520(a)(2):
Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign main
proceeding—
....
(2) sections 363, 549, and 552 apply to a transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States to the same extent that the section would apply to property of an
estate. 105

The question was whether this provision statutorily requires a de novo
sale hearing in the chapter 15 case under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On rehearing, the Second Circuit found that the plain meaning of the statute
requires a section 363 hearing. 106 It rejected the purchaser’s argument that

101. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 768 F.3d 239, 241 (2d Cir. 2014).
102. Id. at 242.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 243.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2) (2012).
106. Farnum Place, LLC v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 690 F. App’x 761, 767 (2d Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 285 (2017) (“The plain language of the statute thus seems to require that, pursuant
to § 363 and our precedent, any sale of debtor property outside of the ordinary course of business can be
approved by the bankruptcy court only after notice, hearing, and a finding of good business reasons to
permit the sale.”).
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section 1520(a)(2) no longer applied once the chapter 15 had entrusted the
Madoff claims to be administered in the BVI. That is, the BVI foreign
representative had already asked the court to entrust the Madoff claims to be
sold in the BVI, which the court approved under section 1521(a)(5), which
authorizes the chapter 15 court to entrust U.S.-based assets to a foreign
administrator only if “the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in
the United States are sufficiently protected.” 107 Because the assets had been
entrusted, the court had already disposed of the U.S. assets and thus section
1520(a)(2) was no longer applicable.
In doing so, the court ended up with a rather strange result, when viewed
in the broader context: the court would have deferred more to the BVI
proceeding if it had been a foreign nonmain proceeding instead of a foreign
main proceeding. Only foreign main proceedings received the automatic
protection of section 1520. Thus, if the BVI had been a foreign nonmain
proceeding, the entrustment order would have been the final word. The
standard for entrustment may have been higher—section 1521(c) imposes an
additional layer of scrutiny on entrustment orders to foreign nonmain
proceedings—but it would have been final. This is exactly the opposite of
how the Model Law generally treats foreign main versus nonmain
proceedings: deference is more appropriate (and relief more generally
available) to foreign main proceedings because the COMI jurisdiction has a
stronger interest in the case. Yet, because the court interacted unpredictably
with the Model Law’s connection to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provision
regarding asset sales, we ended up with a result at odds with the Model Law’s
information-hiding protocols.
C. Summary
These are all examples of implementation problems from the U.S.
experience with the Model Law, but there are certainly examples one could
find from the experience of other courts (again, Adrian Walters’s piece on
the controversial U.K. case Rubin v. Eurofinance SA 108 is extremely
important). The examples cited here have been described as reflecting the
problems of local interests and of local methods; however, as discussed here,
they can be helpfully framed as problems of imperfect modularity.

107. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(5) & (b).
108. [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
In this final part of the paper, I end with a brief example of how
modularization can provide guidance on how to apply the Model Law. In
particular, insights from the modular structure of the Model Law help to
situate choice-of-law decisions. That is, we can see that even though the
Model Law largely (and deliberately 109) elides controversial choice-of-law
questions, it indicates who should be making those difficult decisions.
Choice of law is an information-intensive exercise, one that is not only
fact-intensive, but also policy-rich. The choice of insolvency law may reflect
deep social and economic policy issues, with ramifications for corporate
governance and labor relations, for example. 110 The Model Law,
accordingly, avoids dealing with this “prickly” issue, as noted by
commentators and reflected in its Guide to Enactment. 111 Some have argued
that choice-of-law rules are inherently baked into the Model Law, though.
For instance, once a foreign bankruptcy proceeding is recognized as a
“foreign main proceeding,” that court will presumably apply its own
substantive bankruptcy law, including those of creditor priority and
distribution. As Ted Janger notes, though, this is not necessarily the case, as
choice-of-forum rules and choice-of-law are more independent than these
critics have asserted. 112 While local courts may be predisposed to applying
their own substantive bankruptcy law, this is not foreordained.
More problematically, I believe, is the sort of hidden choice-of-law
decisions that courts must make when applying the Discretionary Assistance
protocols. As identified and discussed by retired bankruptcy judge Allan
Gropper, courts deciding whether the interests of local creditors are

109. Pottow, supra note 14, at 954.
110. John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Lesson from
Maritime Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 269–70 (2007) (“Bankruptcy law embodies and reflects
each society’s particular choices concerning its attitudes toward money, debt, the relationship between
those with property and those without, employers and labor, and so on. In other words, bankruptcy law
reflects and embodies deep social issues that define the structure and aspirations of a society.” (footnote
omitted)); Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (“New
insolvency systems must instead reflect how individual nations have experienced the growth of market
economies, and how, philosophically, countries have viewed debt. Bankruptcy systems are social tools.”).
111. Pottow, supra note 14, at 941 (describing bankruptcy’s rules of priority and distribution as
“‘prickly’ because they are highly normative and driven by domestic policy”); Edward J. Janger,
Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 832 (2007) (noting that the Model Law addresses
only the choice of forum, leaving aside rules regarding choice of law and substantive entitlements);
MODEL LAW, supra note 13, at 25 (describing the scope of the Model Law as “limited to some procedural
aspects of cross-border insolvency cases”).
112. Janger, supra note 111, at 832–33.
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“sufficiently protected” must make a choice-of-law determination, even if
they often do so only implicitly.
Consider here the example of a well-known chapter 15 case that can
highlight this issue. In re Qimonda AG involved a German manufacturer of
semiconductor memory devices that filed for bankruptcy in Germany in
2009 and then opened ancillary proceedings in the United States. 113 As part
of its chapter 15 filing, it sought relief under the Discretionary Relief
protocol, asking the court to entrust the company’s U.S. patents to be
administered in the German main proceeding. The controversy in the case
focused on the impact this might have on the patent licensees: Under U.S.
bankruptcy law, it is not possible to terminate the rights of licensees; under
German law, this was an unsettled matter. Accordingly, U.S. patent licensees
objected to the entrustment order.
The Discretionary Relief protocol authorized the U.S. ancillary court to
entrust the assets to the German liquidation proceeding “only if the interests
of the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor, are
sufficiently protected.” 114 The bankruptcy court initially granted the order,
finding that the interests of the estate would be best served by having the
worldwide patent portfolio centrally administered; furthermore, to the extent
the licensees feared they would be treated less favorably under German
insolvency law than under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the court said that this
was a matter to be litigated in the German insolvency proceeding. 115
The District Court reversed and remanded, finding that the bankruptcy
court had failed to adequately consider the interests of the U.S. patent
licensees and to determine whether the requested relief would violate
fundamental U.S. public policy. 116 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court reversed
course, finding that the interests of the licensees outweighed the harm to the
estate and that terminating licensee rights would violate public policy—
which the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the balancing interests prong (without
reaching the public policy prong). 117
For purposes of this section, Qimonda is a good illustration of the
problems of information flow. There is considerable disagreement about
whether the court got this right—the outcome was decidedly territorialist in
113. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a) (2012).
115. In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-RGM, 2009 WL 4060083, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19,
2009) (“The legal theory arises under German law and is best resolved by German courts. It should not
be complicated by superimposing [U.S. Bankruptcy Code] § 365 on the analysis.”), aff’d in part,
remanded in part sub nom. In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010).
116. In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. at 571.
117. Jaffe, 737 F.3d at 17.
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nature, but then again the Model Law specifically requires a certain degree
of territorialism. 118 While this disagreement has focused on this
territorialism-universalism issue, it can helpfully be re-framed as a
disagreement about the appropriate amount of information intensity, which
in turn has important implications for which court should make the choiceof-law decision. The first bankruptcy court ruling limited the information
flow considerably, thus shifting the choice-of-law decision to the German
court: we have a German debtor seeking to apply German insolvency law in
a way that has obvious benefits to the cross-border estate and uncertain costs
to local creditors, and creditors should handle that in Germany. On remand,
we see the court seizing the choice-of-law decision for itself, assuming (a)
that U.S. bankruptcy law would apply to the U.S. patent licenses and (b) that
German law would result in the termination of licensing agreements. We do
not know if these assumptions are true or false. Verification of the first would
require an information-intensive choice-of-law analysis. Verification of the
second would require litigation in Germany.
Thus, while Qimonda can be understood as a triumph of local interests
over universalism interests, it can usefully be understood as highlighting the
choice-of-law problem in the Discretionary Assistance protocol. When we
consider the case in light of the Model Law’s information hiding features,
we see that the Model Law “starves” the ancillary court from the information
it needs to conduct choice-of-law analyses, thus implicitly shifting the
decision to the foreign main proceeding (here, the German proceeding). That
is, even though the Model Law does not dictate a choice-of-law rule, its
information-restricting features make it impracticable to conduct a choiceof-law analysis in the ancillary proceeding. By limiting the information flow
to ancillary proceedings, the Model Law can be seen as implicitly preventing
those choice-of-law decisions from being made in the ancillary proceedings.
In other words, the Model Law centralizes those decisions in the foreign
main proceeding. Accordingly, although the Model Law does not create a
choice-of-law rule of its own, it does tell us which court should be making
that analysis.
While the Model Law’s structure, then, does not resolve the prickly
choice-of-law questions, its modular design structure provides helpful
guidance as to which courts should be making those information-intensive
decisions.

118. See, e.g., John J. Chung, In Re Qimonda Ag: The Conflict Between Comity and the Public
Policy Exception in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 89 (2014); Dawson, supra
note 6.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to use the insights of modularity to help explain
how courts have interpreted and should interpret the Model Law’s rules for
inter-court cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. Focusing on the
level of information flow between foreign bankruptcy proceedings and
ancillary proceedings, we can see that the Model Law creates a structure that
promotes certain basic cooperation that is automatically available to foreign
main proceedings. Whereas prior bankruptcy law required, or at least
permitted a factually intensive analysis, the Model Law restricts the flow of
information when making the initial determination of whether to grant
automatic relief to the foreign proceeding. When determining whether to
grant discretionary relief beyond that available automatically, the Model
Law restricts the information courts are to consider—not as much as it does
for automatic relief, but more than it did under the prior, pre-Model Law
statute.
It is the aim of this Article to frame this decision making within this
modularity framework. Such an approach does not solve the choice of law
questions that arise in cross-border insolvencies; however, it helps to situate
these questions within the modular framework of the Model Law.

